the Aegean to twelve miles would be a casus belli for Turkey. The succession of Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou by the moderate Konstantinos Simitis coincided with the Imia/Kardak crisis which brought Greece and Turkey to the brink of armed conflict over the sovereignty of an islet in the Aegean. 1 Greece's development of a "joint defense doctrine" with Cyprus and its support for Cyprus' decision to install a unit of S-300 anti-aircraft ballistic missiles in 1998 only made relations worse. An alltime low was reached in February. It was then revealed that Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), and Turkey's most wanted person had found refuge in the Greek Embassy in Nairobi before being captured by Turkish security forces.
The Öcalan crisis proved an opportunity for the Simitis administration to reorient its foreign policy towards Turkey and take a more moderate stance.
Accepting to host the controversial S-300 missiles in Crete instead of Cyprus was a first signal of this change. Appointing George Papandreou -a known moderate-to the Foreign Minister office in the aftermath of the Öcalan crisis would lead to a set of developments which would catalyze Greek-Turkish relations. Interestingly the Greek academic community remained aloof from this shift which remained limited to the political elite. 2 Shortly after the Öcalan affair, Foreign Ministers George Papandreou and Ismail Cem started taking careful steps towards the normalization of GreekTurkish relations. A first opportunity for dialogue emerged with the outbreak of the Kosovo war, a major regional crisis involving both countries. 3 In May 1999
Papandreou and Cem launched a dialogue initiative. Avoiding the "explosive" highpolitics disputes, both ministers prioritized collaborating in low-profile bilateral issues, such as trade, tourism and environment. This timid détente attempt was unexpectedly facilitated by two earthquake disasters which hit Turkey and Greece in August and September 1999, respectively. The two earthquakes, which took place within a few weeks, allowed for a stunning wave of mutual sympathy and 1 For more details on the state of Greek-Turkish relations of that era and the role of the Imia/Kardak crisis, see
Ekavi Athanassopoulou, "Blessing in Disguise? The Imia Crisis and Turkish-Greek Relations", Mediterranean Politics 2, no. 3 (1997) .
2 Panayotis Tsakonas, "Theory and Practice in Greek Foreign Policy", Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 5, no. 3 (2005) : 431-34.
compassion. While there was no causal relationship between the post-earthquake sentiment and the rapprochement process, it clearly showed that the two peoples were more willing to accept a breakthrough in bilateral relations than previously thought. 4 It also meant that a change of Greek policy on EU-Turkey relations would not meet the feared vehement objection of media and public opinion. The Helsinki decision hence attempted to consolidate a détente and navigate a reconciliation process through fostering the resolution of the two disputes that shadowed bilateral relations for decades, the Cyprus and the Aegean questions. Both countries had declared their commitment to a rapprochement process which aimed to reframe bilateral relations, open new avenues of cooperation and contribute to innovative thinking and compromise solutions for the long-standing bilateral disputes.
This was by no means an easy process, yet it was possible to discern a paradigmatic shift at the elite level in both countries from a zero-sum-game and relative-gainsdriven approach of bilateral relations to a positive-sum-game and absolute-gainsdriven approach. Both sides came to the conclusion that they would be better off if CBMs dealt with military issues and aimed to prevent a "hot incident" in the Aegean.
Following the Helsinki decision, however, a comprehensive set of CBMs was introduced for the first time. The first set of measures was named "tension reduction measures" and aimed to improve transparency between the two governments and military leaderships. The second set of measures was "environmental" and focused on low-level cooperation in order to prevent the pollution of the river Evros (Meriç) which forms the largest part of the two countries' land border. While the scope of cooperation was rather limited, these CBMs were of paramount significance. They contributed to the establishment of a tacit security regime between Greece and Turkey and undermined the dominant zero-sum-game mentality in bilateral relations.
Bringing both the government and the military leaderships closer also meant that the chances of armed conflict became considerably reduced. 
c. Energy relations
The construction of a pipeline connecting the Greek and Turkish national gas grid opened new prospects for cooperation in the field of energy which could have implications on the European level. 12 The Interconnector Turkey-Greece-Italy (TGI) from complete restitution of the Greek minority to its property rights. Following decades of discrimination, minority Greeks thought that the AKP administration could deliver solution to some of their problems. Supporting Turkey's democratisation and Europeanization process was also essential. The Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew I, despite widespread suspicion by Turkish nationalists, has been one of the most consistent and ardent supporters of Turkey's EU membership vocation, arguing that this is the best guarantee for religious freedom and the survival of the decimated Greek minority.
The Missed Opportunity of 2004
The Cyprus Question about the bilateral resolution of the dispute expired. Nevertheless, the advent of the Karamanlis administration resulted in a new approach to the Helsinki process.
While it did not undo the rapprochement process, the Karamanlis government did not take the conflict resolution process to its logical consequences, namely that the peaceful judicial resolution of Greek-Turkish disputes in the Aegean would probably entail a compromise which would not be identical with the official Greek position. 
Conclusions
Foreign Minister Davutoğlu's "zero-problems with neighbours' policy" was aimed to relieve Turkey of its bilateral disputes in order to advance it to a leading position in global politics. While at first it was argued that resolving bilateral problems with neighbours was a prerequisite for Turkey to play its global role, it soon appeared, however, that Turkey lacked the diplomatic capacity to further all these objectives simultaneously. Turkey's regional and global ambitions meant, in the end, that the resolution of bilateral Greek-Turkish disputes and the Cyprus problem would not be high on the agenda of Turkish foreign policy. This was valid in particular since the prospect of Turkey's full EU membership appeared to be rather dim in the end of 2011.
There is still strong debate on both sides of the Aegean whether the fundamentals of the countries' political relationship have improved, subsequent to the 1999 Helsinki milestone and the initiation of Turkey's EU accession process. View publication stats View publication stats
